按“知”分配何以可能？

doi:10.3785/j.issn.1008-942X.CN33-6000/C.2021.05.254

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Abstract In the period of China’s planned economy, university teachers’ remuneration took fair distribution as its value orientation. During the period of market-oriented economy, a distribution system with efficiency as the value orientation was developed. In the new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the era of the knowledge economy, encouraging knowledge innovation and realizing knowledge value have become the new value orientations. Although the current performance-based remuneration in Chinese universities links the actual contribution of teachers with remuneration distribution, there are four problems that need to be solved urgently. First, the current remuneration structure is unbalanced. Some invisible and long-term oriented performance elements are ignored while some visible and immediate academic outputs are over-emphasized. Thus, different elements of the current remuneration system should be reconsidered and adjusted. Second, the system of remuneration measurement is flawed, calling for the innovation of the performance measurement index system and optimisation of the method of performance evaluation. Third, the high-intensity remuneration incentives bring negative effects on teachers’ intrinsic motivations. Guaranteed remuneration should consequently be redesigned to provide the academic professions with a sense of occupational security. Fourth, remuneration adjustments are relatively lagging behind, making remuneration incapable of adjusting to the average remuneration of the labor market, the living index and price growth. It is urgent to establish an anchoring remuneration mechanism in which teachers’ remunerations are correspondingly adjusted to the purchasing power caused by different living costs in different regions.This study conducted 206 questionnaires and 32 in-depth interviews with university administrators, relevant experts and teachers. Based on quantitative questionnaires and qualitative interview data, a 3P-M remuneration model was constructed, which was based on the improvement of the current performance-based remuneration. This remuneration model was designed to meet the requirements of academic career paths, while reflecting the value of knowledge. The 3P-M remuneration model integrates four dimensions of remuneration. Specifically, remuneration distribution is built on the basis of individual human capital (P₁), post (P₂), performance (P₃), market (M), which reflects the requirement of participating in the distribution of various elements according to their contributions. It is expected that a remuneration distribution system of combining multiple distribution modes will be built, which are designed for different types of academic professions. One is the combination of labor-based pay, performance-based pay, knowledge-based pay, and the other is the combination of compensation distribution, short-term distribution and long-term distribution.Compared with performance-based remuneration, a 3P-M remuneration distribution makes multiple adjustments. Specifically, Human capital remuneration (P₁) is improved to compensate for the faculty’s early investment, current addition and later appreciation. Post-based remuneration (P₂) is adjusted to flatten the slope of the remuneration curve by strengthening the guaranteed remuneration. Performance-based remuneration (P₃) is optimized to solve the complexity of academic performance evaluation and the multi-task principal-agent contract design. Market-based remuneration (M) is newly added, which compensates for potential compensation losses of teachers due to the insufficient total internal compensation. In this model, 3P focuses on revitalizing the stock, and M focuses on expanding increments, which together constitute a 3+X four-dimensional remuneration system of Human capital remuneration+Post-based remuneration+Performance-based remuneration+Market-based remuneration. In other words, the total remuneration (S) of knowledge value can be expressed as, S=(S_p₁+S_p2+S_p₃)×N+S_m. Among them, S_p₁ represents Human capital remuneration, S_p₂ represents Post-based remuneration, S_p₃represents Performance-based remuneration, S_m represents Market-based remuneration, and N represents remuneration adjustment coefficient.It should be emphasized that for different types of college teachers, the design of the remuneration structure should not be one-size-fits-all. For example, research universities and comprehensive universities should adopt the market-leading remuneration with external competitiveness. Teaching-centered universities could ensure the achievement of organizational goals by adopting market-matching remuneration. Vocational universities would stabilize their faculty as long as they provide cost-oriented remuneration. More specifically, for high-level talents, a negotiated remuneration system that is higher than the market price should be adopted. 3P-M remuneration systems should be implemented for essential talents, contract remuneration or hourly pay is more suitable for alliance talents and performance-based remuneration system should be applied to assistant talents.

Key words： college teachers knowledge value salary design 3P-M model

Received: 25 May 2021

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Zhu Yucheng,Jin Xuejun. How Can Remuneration Distribution on the Basis of Knowledge Be Made Possible? College Remuneration Reform in the New Era of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics[J]. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2022, 52(3): 150-161.

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https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/EN/10.3785/j.issn.1008-942X.CN33-6000/C.2021.05.254 OR https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/EN/Y2022/V52/I3/150

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