|
|
|
| How to Punish Administrative Violations: The Function and Positioning of Administrative Compensation and Its Philosophical Foundations |
| Jiang Chengxu |
| Legislation Research Institution, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310008, China |
|
|
|
|
Abstract According to the two legislative purposes of the State Compensation Law, filling losses and preventing violations are the two basic functions of administrative compensation. In recent years, judicial practice has emphasized that administrative compensation should reflect the “punishment” for administrative violations. Regarding the phenomenon of “punishing”, there is a common view that the requirement of administrative compensation to reflect the “punishment” of administrative violations is not really to punish the administrative organs, but to emphasize the substantive filling losses of the parties. The primary reason why the court needs to emphasize the “punishment” of administrative violations to achieve the function of filling losses is that the administrative compensation system follows the principle of consolatory compensation, and the function of filling losses is very limited. Therefore, it is justifiable for the court to “punish” the administrative violation as the justification basis for increasing the degree of compensation. However, while emphasizing “punishment”, the courts often adopt procedural administrative compensation judgments, only ordering the administrative organ to make a new administrative compensation decision. If the court is to improve the degree of administrative compensation, then it should consistently make a substantive administrative compensation decision to solve the administrative compensation dispute at once. Moreover, emphasizing “punishment” is not the best way to achieve the function of filling losses. It is more efficient to replace compensation with reparation. Therefore, it cannot be simply understood as helping to achieve the function of filling losses of administrative compensation.Another common view on the phenomenon of “punishment” is that the meaning of “punishment” is to make administrative violations pay the corresponding price through the increase of compensation which prevents administrative violations. However, it is doubtful whether “punishment” can really help to achieve the function of preventing. In public law, it is difficult to establish the hypothesis of economically rational person. More critically, even if the administrative organ can respond to the economic stimulus of administrative compensation, there is more than one way to stimulate, and a higher amount of reparation can have the same effect. Second, it is difficult to reflect the true cost of administrative violations and administrative compensation can be affected by the way administrative litigation is determined, the logic of the government’s actions under the hierarchical administrative system, and many other factors. Third, the function of preventing violations depends on the precise attribution of responsibility. The “punishment” rationale does not provide further clarity on whether the target of “punishment” is intentional or negligent. Therefore, the argument based on “punishment” of administrative violations does not provide sufficient support to achieve the function of preventing violations.It is the moral implications of “punishment” that provide the best perspective for understanding this phenomenon. From the perspective of the moral philosophy of tort law, the purpose of tort liability law is to achieve corrective justice between parties. The value of administrative compensation as tort liability does not lie in the optimal dispersion of losses or the optimal deterrence and prevention. These functions are the results rather than the purposes of administrative compensation. The judicial practice of “punishing” reflects the judicial efforts to return the philosophical basis of administrative compensation to corrective justice. In the law of tort liability, it is the fault and not the violation of law, that is culpable. The real target of “punishing” by administrative compensation is not the administrative violations, but the faults in the administrative violations. The practice of administrative compensation trials is striving to re-establish a close connection with tort law through the technique of legal interpretation. The philosophical foundation of corrective justice and the institutional positioning of tort liability can provide the most appropriate explanation for the “punishment” phenomenon.
|
|
Received: 24 February 2021
|
|
|
|
1 江必新主编： 《〈中华人民共和国国家赔偿法〉条文理解与适用》，北京：人民法院出版社，2010年。
2 江必新、梁凤云、梁清： 《国家赔偿法理论与实务》（下），北京：中国社会科学出版社2010年。
3 沈岿： 《国家赔偿法：原理与案例》，北京：北京大学出版社，2017年。
4 姜明安编： 《行政法与行政诉讼法》，北京：北京大学出版社，2015年。
5 蒋成旭： 《国家赔偿的本土逻辑与制度构造》，《法制与社会发展》2019年第1期，第87-104页。
6 张文显： 《法哲学范畴研究》，北京：中国政法大学出版社，2001年。
7 Coleman J.， “The costs of the costs of accidents，” Maryland Law Review， Vol. 64， No. 1 （2005）， pp. 337-354.
8 宇賀克也： ??国家責任の機能??，兼子仁、宮崎良夫編： 『行政法学の現状分析——高柳信一先生古稀記念論集』，東京：勁草書房，1991年。
9 朱岩： 《侵权责任法通论·总论》，北京：法律出版社，2011年。
10 赵刚： 《损益相抵论》，《清华法学》2009年第6期，第87-102页。
11 日］吉村良一： 《日本侵权行为法》，张挺译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2013年。
12 Schwartz J. C.， “How governments pay： lawsuits， budgets， and police reform，” UCLA Law Review， Vol. 63 （2016）， pp. 1144-1298.
13 Posner R. A.， Economic Analysis of Law， New York： Wolters Kluwer Law & Business， 1986.
14 卢超： 《行政诉讼司法建议制度的功能衍化》，《法学研究》2015年第3期，第19-30页。
15 沈岿： 《国家赔偿：代位责任还是自己责任》，《中国法学》2008年第1期，第103-113页。
16 Rustad M. L.， “Twenty-first-century tort theories： the internalist/externalist debate，” Indiana Law Journal， Vol. 88， No. 2 （2013）， pp. 419-447.
17 江必新、梁凤云、梁清： 《国家赔偿法理论与实务》（上），北京：中国社会科学出版社，2010年。
18 Perry S. R.， “The moral foundations of tort law，” Iowa Law Review， Vol. 77 （1991）， pp. 449-514.
19 叶金强： 《论侵权法的基本定位》，《现代法学》2015年第5期，第63-73页。
20 王磊： 《完全赔偿原则与侵权损害赔偿之反思及构筑》，《法律科学》2019年第4期，第120-129页。
21 加］欧内斯特·J.温里布： 《私法的理念》，徐爱国译，北京：北京大学出版社，2007年。
22 朱新力、余军： 《国家赔偿归责原则的实证分析》，《浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2005年第2期，第 117-124页。
23 周汉华： 《论国家赔偿的过错责任原则》，《法学研究》1996年第3期，第136-143页。
24 蒋成旭： 《认真对待过错：再论国家赔偿的过错归责》，《浙江学刊》2021年第3期，第97-107页。
25 杜仪方： 《国家赔偿相关概念辨析与制度实践》，北京：中国法制出版社，2018年。 |
|
|
|
2021, Vol. 51 
