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A Study on the Longevity Risk of the Personal Account of Basic Pension Insurance for Employees and Its Estimation |
Yang Yixin1,2 |
1.School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China 2.Center of Social Welfare and Governance, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China |
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Abstract Since 1997, the basic pension insurance for employees in China has followed the model of “social pooling and personal accounts”. After more than 20 years of operation, the number of beneficiaries has continued to expand, and the level of benefits has increased year by year, which has effectively guaranteed the basic livelihood of retirees. But at the same time, we need to note that the financial sustainability of employee basic pension insurance has begun to arouse the attention of the whole society. Especially in recent years, China’s problem of population aging has been growing, the average life expectancy has continued to increase, and the employee’s basic pension insurance dependency ratio has been decreasing year by year. The pay-as-you-go pension insurance system is facing challenges. The original intention of setting up personal accounts was to make up for the inadequacies of the pay-as-you-go model for the aging population, and to resolve longevity risks through a model of fund accumulation. Therefore, it is necessary to re-evaluate the policy design and practical operation effects of the basic pension insurance personal accounts for employees, especially the role it played in dealing with longevity risks. This paper starts from the design of the personal account system of basic pension insurance for Chinese employees and systematically expounds the formation and transmission mechanism of longevity risks for personal accounts. The so-called longevity risk refers to the financial risk of the fund caused by the inconsistency between the actual lifespan of the insured group and the life expectancy set by the mechanism design of current personal account. In the event of personal account longevity risk, the “risk source” is mainly a series of flaws in the design of the personal account system. The “risk transmission path” is mainly due to such factors as life span elongation and the personal account foundations not being able to pay off. “Risk amplification station” is mainly in the operation of the system, when a series of policies have led to accelerated consumption of personal account deposits. We have established an actuarial model that characterizes the longevity risk of personal accounts leading to fund risk. Taking a “standard insured person” as the object of analysis, with the aid of actuarial analysis methods, it is estimated that when the fund’s investment return rate is 4%, the personal account fund can pay up to the age of 74 for the insured person who retires at the age of 60. The insured person of 75 or older will be paid out of the pooling fund for the personal account treatment. When the fund’s investment return rate is 8%, the personal account fund can pay until the age of 84. The longevity risk of personal accounts arises from the combined effect of multiple reasons. This paper further describes the effects of policy adjustment factors and demographic environment factors on the longevity risk of personal accounts. The main conclusions are: (1) If the actual investment return rate of the fund is 8% and the bookkeeping interest rate is 4%, the consumption of personal account fund balance will be greatly accelerated, and the time when personal account balance is exhausted will be advanced from 75 to 65. (2) If the basic pension and the personal account pension are adjusted together, the time when the savings in the personal account are exhausted will be advanced from the age of 75 to 71. (3) In accordance with the trend of current population aging, other factors aside, the growth of the personal account fund gap is relatively stable. (4) If the above factors are combined, the personal account fund gap will increase from 661.922 billion yuan in 2020 to 3,090.702 billion yuan in 2035, and the ratio of the gap to basic pension expenditure will rise from 17.4% in 2020 to 22.9% in 2035. This article proposes the following policy measures to deal with the longevity risks of personal accounts: (1) Establish a reasonable method for adjusting the interest rate of personal accounts. (2) Strictly control the increase in personal account pension standards. (3) Establish a dynamic adjustment mechanism of the number of months for personal account payment in accordance with age, gender and time. In the era of longevity, improving the personal account system will better promote the sustainable operation of the basic pension insurance for employees.
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Received: 27 July 2020
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