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| Green Credit of Commercial Banks: The Implementation Paths and Legal Barriers |
| Huang Tao |
| Guanghua Law School, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310008, China |
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Abstract Throughout the world, green credit of commercial banks is the most typical green finance mechanism. Its core is to include environmental test standards, pollution control effects, ecological protection and other factors into the decision-making of credit granting by commercial banks.Green credit mechanism shows different intrinsic attributes and external features because it starts and grows up in different regions or at various stages of historical development. Specifically, a system of green credit establishes itself and develops in three possible paths: (1) norms of self-regulation, or voluntary codes of conduct, with the Equator Principles (EPs) as a typical example; (2) environmental tort and compensation liability under private law, with the US Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, or Superfund) as typical examples; (3) promotion by administrative power under public law, with China's current green credit policy as a typical example. The above three paths are not completely exclusive as many of them would integrate with others to make a difference in different regions or at various stages of development in history.Paths of realizing different green credit policies are always related to the traits of financial market and legal system in some countries. In China, the development and improvement of legal system of green credit is premised on the knowledge of supportive conditions under which various paths of realizing green credit policies make a difference. Regarding the above three paths, the voluntary codes of conduct featuring soft law is expected to be introduced to China's commercial banking system against the backdrop of immature financial market. The environmental tort liability of commercial banks is supposed to be determined by compulsory legislation. Though such tort liability has been exemplified by foreign practices, it is still controversial. Its introduction to China would also be faced with a challenge of integrating with China's current legal system of tort liability and of regulation on commercial banks, which would probably increase social cost. As for the widespread use of administrative power to promote green credit policies, it is a result of insufficient legal limitations on the current financial system. The use of administrative power can play a role to some extent at current stages, but its long-term effectiveness and stability could not be ensured institutionally.To develop green credit policies in China, it is necessary to think outside the box to search for a responsive policy to China's institutional environment. China's commercial banks granting credit to high pollution and high energy consumption areas is largely not out of their commercial interests. Instead, their choices are influenced by various external factors. Therefore, in order to push forward China's green credit development, it is essential to highlight that commercial banks bear the responsibility for their business activities for investors and the market, improving their corporate governance mechanisms and risk management capabilities.
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Received: 04 December 2019
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2021, Vol. 51 
