|
|
|
| How Does Jin Yuelin’s Na?ve Realism Respond to the Causal Argument from Hallucination |
| Gu Zhiwei |
| School of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China |
|
|
|
|
Abstract Jin Yuelin’s na?ve realism demonstrates unique philosophical insights and responses when confronting the causal argument from hallucination in contemporary philosophy of perception. Jin Yuelin defines veridical perception as a relation between the subject and external objects, emphasizing that presentation in veridical perception has the dual nature of being both content and object. In hallucinations, however, presentation exists only as content, lacking an object. This duality provides theoretical resources for addressing the indistinguishability issue in the causal argument. Indistinguishability refers to the subject’s being unable to distinguish between experiences of veridical perception and hallucination. Jin Yuelin explains this phenomenon through the similarity in the content of presentation, while maintaining that veridical perception is essentially different from hallucination because it has external objects as its objects. Compared with contemporary representationalism, Jin Yuelin’s concept of presentation also reveals significant differences. Contemporary representationalism views perceptual content as representations with accuracy conditions corresponding to external facts, whereas Jin Yuelin rejects this representational view. He argues that in veridical perception, presentation is the external object itself, without a split between representation and what is represented, and the objectivity of content arises from its consistency among normal subjects, not from accurate correspondence with external objects. This non-representational concept of content offers flexibility to na?ve realism, allowing it to explain indistinguishability without relying on subjective images or sense data, while preserving direct access to the external world.Additionally, Jin Yuelin’s central view of veridical perception constitutes a form of transcendental na?ve realism. He considers veridical perception conceptually prior to other perceptions (such as illusions and hallucinations) and as the standard for correcting them. This transcendence stems from veridical perception’s role in maintaining the order of experience, making it the foundation and source of knowledge. The empirically based causal argument from hallucination seeks to prove that veridical perception and hallucination are essentially the same by appealing to the principle of “the same proximate cause, the same immediate effect”. However, Jin Yuelin critiques the causal theory, arguing that although external objects can cause presentations, they cannot account for the specific content of presentations or clarify the relational nature of veridical perception. This critique challenges the validity of the principle, suggesting that the same proximate cause may lead to essentially different experiential outcomes: in veridical perception, presentation and object are unified, whereas in hallucination, presentation is merely a subject-dependent image.Although Jin Yuelin’s na?ve realism superficially resembles contemporary disjunctivism—for instance, both highlight the difference between veridical perception and hallucination at the object level—their concerns and theoretical aims are fundamentally distinct. Jin Yuelin focuses on the source and material of knowledge, aiming at establishing a realistic foundation for epistemology, while contemporary disjunctivism centers on the nature of sensory experience, addressing internalist challenges within the causal framework. Furthermore, Jin Yuelin does not deeply explore the nature of hallucination or take on the explanatory burden that disjunctivists assume for hallucination phenomena. Thus, Jin Yuelin’s na?ve realism is not disjunctivism but a distinctive system built around veridical perception. This system, through the duality and transcendence of presentation, sidesteps the direct threat posed by the causal hallucination argument to na?ve realism.
|
|
Received: 27 August 2024
|
|
|
|
1 Campbell J.， Reference and Consciousness， Oxford： Oxford University Press， 2002.
2 Alford-Duguid D. & Arsenault M.， “On the explanatory power of hallucination，” Synthese， Vol. 194， No. 5 （2017）， pp. 1765-1785.
3 Johnston M.， “Is the external world invisible？” Philosophical， Vol. 7 （1996）， pp. 185-198.
4 Martin M. G. F.， “The transparency of experience，” Mind and Language， Vol. 17， No. 4 （2002）， pp. 376-425.
5 Robinson H.， Perception and Idealism： An Essay on How the World Manifests Itself to Us， and How It （Probably） Is in Itself， Oxford： Oxford University Press， 2022.
6 金岳霖：《知识论》，北京：商务印书馆，1983年。
7 Travis C.， “The silence of the senses，” Mind， Vol. 113， No. 449 （2004）， pp. 57-94.
8 Logue H.， “Good news for the disjunctivist about （one of） the Bad Cases，” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research， Vol. 86， No. 1 （2013）， pp. 105-133.
9 Martin M. G. F.， “The limits of self-awareness，” Philosophical Studies， Vol. 120， No. 1 （2004）， pp. 37-89.
10 Wittgenstein L.， Zettel， ed. by Anscombe G. E. M. & von Wright G. H.， trans. by Anscombe G. E. M.， Oxford： Blackwell， 1967.
11 Hinton J. M.， “Visual experiences，” Mind， Vol. 76， No. 302 （1967）， pp. 217-227.
12 Grice H. P.， “The causal theory of perception， part I，” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society， Vol. 121 （1961）， pp. 121-152.
13 Allen K.， “Hallucination and imagination，” Australasian Journal of Philosophy， Vol. 93， No. 2 （2015）， pp. 287-302. |
| [1] |
. [J]. , 2006, 36(5): 74-. |
|
|
|
|
2025, Vol. 55 
