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The Concept of the Rule of Law: From Essentially Contested to Fiction |
Yu Haitao |
Institute of Law, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Shanghai 200042, China |
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Abstract The rule of law is the most prominent legalized political ideal in the world today, but there is no consensus on what it means. The process of pointing out the importance of the rule of law has been completed from the perspective of practical needs in China and the goal of building a country governed by the rule of law has been established, while the definition of the rule of law is still stuck in the debates of various views on the rule of law. Judging from the leaders’ understanding of the rule of law in the early days of the reform and opening up, our country determined the goal of the thickest form of the rule of law from the beginning, but then the consensus on the rule of law disappeared into debates of form and essence, universalism and nationalism, separation and integrity.Faced with the situation that everyone has different opinions about the concept of the rule of law, some people have proposed to define it as an essentially controversial concept. This theory has certain explanatory power, affirms the competitive situation of the concept of the rule of law, advises those who flaunt the rule of law not to try to monopolize the concept of the rule of law, and is of great value in promoting the prosperity of theory. However, the theory does not seem to be as correct as it is taken for granted. Firstly, this definition avoids the consensus on the rule of law. There is no realistic “paradigm”for the rule of law, but there is a certain consensus on the connotation of “the rule of the law”. If this is regarded as a paradigm like Jeremy Waldron did, then this “paradigm” is not open; moreover, in disputes over the rule of law, this connotation is not always maintained and developed, but on the contrary, it always faces the risk of being disintegrated. Secondly, this definition is prone to relativism. This definition abandons the normative power of the connotation of the rule of law and reduces it to an empty shell that can hold anything. And it may provide theoretical weapons to theorists deconstructing the rule of law and enable them to embark on the path of disputing, opposing and abandoning the rule of law with peace of mind, thus it has a bad rhetorical effect on the current practice of the rule of law. Thirdly, this definition cannot respond to the query of “the impossibility of the rule of law”. The myth or lie theory of the rule of law demonstrates the proposition of “the impossibility of the rule of law” from both the premise and reasoning of the law. This definition not only fails to respond effectively, but also, according to David Gawthorne, stems from this dilemma of the rule of law.As far as China’s current stage of the rule of law is concerned, it is necessary to clarify and return to the original connotation of the rule of law, that is, “the rule of the law”. Criticism that “the rule of law” is a myth or lie cannot be established. The rule of law is an ideal or a fiction. The fiction theory of the rule of law well responds to the dilemma of “the impossibility of the rule of law”. Not all fictional assertions against facts are myths or lies. The myth or lie theory of the rule of law grasps the fictional nature of the rule of law and refutes it without correctly understanding the fictional nature of the rule of law. Fiction is both fictional and factual. Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of fiction and Yuval Harari’s theory of cognitive revolution tell us that it is a fictional fact, an expedient invention and creation, and a basis for human cooperation and progress. Such inventions and creations make all civilized life possible. The fiction theory of the rule of law defends the position of the rule of law through both theoretical responses and practical needs.
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Received: 02 September 2024
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