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| The Implementation Mechanism of Rural Effective Governance: A Case Study Based on the Village Level Housing Rehabilitation Program |
| Qian Wenrong1, Guo Xiaolin1, Wang Dazhe2 |
1.China Academy for Rural Development (CARD), Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China
2.School of Economic, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 320100, China |
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Abstract The realization of governance effectiveness is based on finding the logical starting point of governance that suits the specific organizational environment. In view of the practical form, rural governance structure can be divided into the types of “top-down” and “bottom-up” governance. In specific, “top-down” governance refers to the process that grassroots leaders or village cadres promote the implementation of national policies through preaching and persuasion so as to motivate villagers’ participation into rural governance. “Bottom-up” governance mainly indicates the process that the “village governance directors” represented by the two village committees actively determine the governance objectives at different stages by combining with the village’s internal needs so as to independently guide the villagers to handle the supply of rural public goods and complete the construction of “a beautiful village”.Although existing researches on the effectiveness of rural governance have made some contributions to the regional experience summary and the framework thinking of governance elements, there is still some room for improving the study of the interactive relationship between multiple governance subjects in under urban-rural joint governance. By means of breaking through the independent governance unit of village, this paper incorporates the interaction among the grassroots governments, the village committee and the villagers into a diachronic research framework through constructing an evolutionary game model featured with urban-rural interaction characteristics, so as to look into the “black box” during interaction among different subjects.Based on analyzing the micro-mechanism of the effectiveness of rural governance, this paper answers the two questions including whether and how ordinary villages can achieve the effective rural governance. According to the research, the relatively scarce governance resources have always been an important factor affecting the effectiveness of rural governance. For this reason, ordinary villages can explore ways to enrich village governance resources by constructing governance structure suitable for village-level fields. This arrangement of effective governance structures can be achieved from grassroots government establishment of effective punishment and incentive mechanisms, the introduction of high-quality market resources, and reshaping of the relationship between village governance directors and villagers. The case study and the numerical simulation of evolutionary games found that as marketization, contractualization, and individualization are becoming more prominent in rural governance structure, the resource interaction between the involved subjects is the main factor restricting the effectiveness of rural governance. During the interaction, the differentiated constraints of grassroots governments are the key to narrow the “lagging interval” of village-level organizations’ mobilization strategies, and the village governance director’s initiative mobilization is the endogenous developing force for effective rural governance.At this stage, it is essential to establish a punishment and incentive mechanism between the grass-roots government, village-level organizations, and villagers, and establish a “coordination and balance” relationship between the three subjects in the national vertical governance system. Besides, village governance leaders should behave themselves, enrich the channels for improving village governance resources, mobilize market resources, strengthen villagers’ collective consciousness and local cultural identity, improve their capabilities, and achieve effective internal regulation of villages. Through the improvement of the governance structure under the framework of urban-rural co-governance, the coordination of different interests, the construction of an incentive mechanism for the active participation of multiple subjects, and the improvement of the endogenous development capacity of the villages, therefore, rural governance could achieve effective goals ultimately.
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Received: 30 September 2020
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2021, Vol. 51 
