The compensation mechanism plays an important role in corporate risk taking (CRT). As a key component of the modern corporate compensation system, the equity incentive plan (EIP) has been widely adopted among Chinese listed companies. However, relevant studies haven't reached an agreement regarding the relationships between EIP and CRT. According to Contract Theory, the outcome of contracts depends on the appropriate arrangement of key contractual terms. Chinese listed companies are obliged to grant EIP with time-and-performance-based vesting constraints. That is, when making risky decisions, executives are confronted with dual restrictions of vesting horizon and performance hurdles. However, most current empirical studies regard EIP as a homogeneous contract and overlook the heterogeneous impacts of the two vesting restriction terms. Using the samples of Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2016, this paper explores the heterogeneous impacts of the dual vesting restrictions on CRT. The empirical results show that the grant of EIP significantly promotes CRT. However, this effect only exists in the samples with long vesting horizon constraints and moderate vesting performance hurdles. In samples with short vesting horizon and stringent vesting performance hurdles, the opposite effect occurs. The results also reveal an interaction effect between the two vesting restriction terms: the vesting horizon constraint not only strengthens the risk taking effect of EIP when the vesting performance hurdle is moderate, but also alleviates the risk aversion effect of EIP when the vesting performance hurdle is stringent. Further research finds that EIP impacts CRT through higher debt financing and R&D investment, and eventually promotes the dynamic growth of corporate value. However, this effect only significantly exists in the samples with long vesting horizon and moderate performance hurdles. This paper contributes to both theory and practice. Firstly, the existing literature mainly focuses on EIP’s direct effect on the static indexes like enterprise performance or behavior, but evidence is lacking with respect to its effect on the behavioral tendency variable. This paper focuses on CRT through which EIP exerts influence on firm performance, thus expands the research on the economic consequences of EIP. Secondly, different from the perspective that regards EIP as a homogeneous contract, this paper considers the heterogeneous effect of its dual vesting constraints. Specifically, this article not only tests the individual effects of vesting horizon constraints and performance hurdles on CRT, but also investigates their interaction effect, which expands the research on antecedents of CRT from the micro perspective of vesting restriction terms. Thirdly, this paper investigates how the risk taking effect of EIP is manifested in corporate investment and financing decisions, and ultimately, how it influences the dynamic change of corporate value. This study develops our understanding of the causal chain and mechanism of EIP’s risk taking effect, which helps open the ″ black box″ of EIP’s economic consequence and enriches the research on the specific route and value effect of CRT. Fourthly, this study found that only EIP with long vesting horizon constraints and moderate vesting performance hurdles can increase CRT, which provides important practical implications to both companies and policy makers. For listed companies, this finding helps to optimize the design of EIP’s vesting restriction terms. For policy makers, this finding offers directions for formulating and improving regulatory policies, administrative measures and guide specifications regarding EIP.