Over the past half century, there has been a debate between the theory of description and the theory of direct reference in the philosophy of language, which began with Saul Kripkes modal argument. However, this debate is deliberately exaggerated, partly due to peoples unfamiliarity with or neglect of the theoretical achievements in demonstratives and indexicals, especially the work of David Kaplan. This article employs the theory of direct reference on indexicals to advance an approach of actualizing description to names, and argues that this approach is promising in rebutting the modal argument and reconciling both parties of the debate. This article holds that actualizing description is the most direct and convenient response that a theorist of description can make to the modal argument. As a context-sensitive indexical expression, an abstract actualized description type has only literal meaning of character; only in a context of use can its particular token obtain a complete content meaning. By returning to the world of context, an actualized description token can locate a unique object as its reference by virtue of its meaning of character and can designate it rigidly, referring to the content meaning of that particular token. Since the rigid designation has been established in the world of context, this article argues that there is no need to identify the referent of the actualized token description in any circumstance or any world of evaluation with the help of descriptive meaning since it directly refers to that object. This article boldly breaks through the strategy of rigidifying description proposed by John Searle, and locates the meaning of actualized description at the level of character, while there is no descriptive meaning but the direct referent itself as meaning at the level of content. Thus, the approach of actualizing description I advance is compatible with the theories of description and direct reference: the reference is determined by virtue of its meaning of character in the context of use, while the object as the referent is referred to directly in the circumstance or world of evaluation, and the referent is precisely restricted to its content meaning. Since an actualized token description has the same rigidity as a name, the modal argument that resorts to the distinction between rigid designator and accidental designator to rebut the new version of the theory of description is no longer valid. This article also focuses on the principle ″analyticity entails necessity″ which the modal argument relies on, and points out that the analyticity of context-sensitive sentence does not entail the necessity of the proposition it may express. I set up a criterion of identity for context-sensitive sentence token: any token belonging to the same sentence type and expressing the same proposition is identical to each other. Furthermore, a new definition is proposed for the analyticity of the indexical sentence, that is, the content (proposition) expressed by any of its tokens is true in the contextual world in which that token may occur, or, all its tokens are necessarily true. Thus, the traditional notion of analyticity is expanded. Based on this, I defend the analyticity of indexical sentences such that ″ιx@(x) is (x)″ in the article, for all its tokens are necessarily true. In the meantime, I emphasize that rigid designator, accidental designator, and direct referential term are all relative to the metaphysical meaning of content and cannot be used as reasons to determine the analyticity or syntheticity of a sentence at the level of linguistic rules. By the same token, this article argues that the analyticity of sentence at the level of linguistic rules does not entail the necessity of proposition expressed at the metaphysical level. The sentence that ″ιx@(x) is (x)″ involving an actualized description is analytic, whereas due to the accidental property that represents a singular proposition expressed by some of its tokens is not necessary or necessarily true. Since no ridiculous corollary follows from the analyticity of the context-sensitive sentence that ″x@(x) is (x)″, the trick of a modal argument to refute the rigidifying description strategy can hardly work. In summary, converting ordinary descriptions that are accidental designators into actualized descriptions that are rigid designators, the approach of actualizing description not only reconciles the theory of description with the theory of direct reference, but also deals with the accusations of analyticity from the modal argument at leisure, for analyticity of a sentence at the level of character does not entail necessity or necessary truth of a proposition it may express at the level of content.