In markets with qualitative uncertainty,pricing on the basis of average quality will be unattractive to participants whose products are above average in quality,quality certification thus could be an alternative to exit from the market in such situation .Overlapping quality certification may significantly improve the consumer's confidence of the food quality and safety .This paper focuses on the multiple quality certification of agri-food producer in Zhejiang province .Based on the producer level data from household farms,farmer cooperatives and agricultural companies,the producer's certification status is modeled using Heckman two-step procedure . The first-stage results using Probit model show that,if the influence of the region which the producer is located,the product category and the type of producer are controlled,the producer's likelihood of certification is determined by the size,the human capital,the brand status,the level to which the producer's markets are diversified,external market incentive,internal entity responsibility,the transaction cost,while the role of the government regulation pressure and producer's resource capability is not significant .In the second-stage,the safety certification intensity of the producers has been studied with the application of the ordered Probit model after correcting sample selection bias . The results show that the number of standards to which a producer is certified is positively related to the size,the human capital,the brand status,external market incentive,internal entity responsibility,but inversely influenced by the level to which the producer's markets are diversified,and the transaction cost . In other words,the producer focusing on a few markets were more likely to certify to one quality standard,but less likely to certify to multiple quality standards,and the producer focusing on out-province market were more likely to certify to multiple quality standards . External market incentive and internal entity responsibility enhance the propensity to be certified to multiple quality standards .While the transaction cost would curb the producer's propensity to be certified to multiple standards . In general,the producer's quality certification decision is the trade-off between the benefits and costs,and constrained by the resource capability of the producer and the environment which the producer faced to .The producer's behavior of quality multiple certification is driven more by market incentive and internal entity responsibility,not the government regulation pressure .The above analysis suggests that frequently-occurred food safety incidents have increased Chinese producers' responsibility about food quality and safety,and the producer could be a reliable power to promote the food quality and safety . Basing on the conclusions all above,it is proposed that the regulation efforts of government in agri-food quality and safety market at this stage should focus on the construction of operation system to safeguard the market mechanism .Firstly,pay more attention to bring the producer's role into full play in food quality and safety,implement the institution to ensure the producer as the first responsibility entity to secure agri-food safety .Secondly,strengthen the supervision of the certification agencies and ensure the reliability of authentication information,and maintain an orderly circumstance of effective certification market . Thirdly,stricter authentication label regulations in product market are required to ensure the accuracy of information released by producers .At last,in order to ensure the practicability of the standards,the government should constantly communicate with the producers,continuously revise the standards according to the feedback from the producers,and reinforce the training and promotion of the standards .