Any political or administrative activity can be separated into decision-making, execution and supervision, and correspondingly, power can be divided into the power of decision-making, the power of execution and the power of supervision. According to this classic framework of trisection, corruption falls into the corruption in decision-making, the corruption in execution and the corruption in supervision. Among them, the corruption in decision-making refers to the deviation of the exercise of public power from public interest in decision-making. Specifically, in the process of decision-making in law and/or policy, development planning, the selection and appointment of officials, public investment, and so on, the decision maker disobeys public interest or gains an unfair advantage for its own interest or for the stakeholders. It is not only distinguished from decision errors by its subjective factor, but also different in their objective performance from corruption in execution and supervision, such as authority and effectiveness. The current tough corruption issue faced by our party and government has much to do with those "leaders" who are mainly responsible for decision-making, indicating the lack of corruption control in China’s current decision-making system. Therefore, the effective control of corruption in decision-making is of great significance to solve the problem of party and government leaders’ corruption. Under the framework of In-Out system analysis, the absence of restriction and supervision mechanism at the input side, within-system and output side of the present decision-making system has left institutionalized space for the realization of improper self-interest and led to the corruption in decision. For this reason, the public-interest-oriented mechanism for power restriction and supervision should be established and strengthened because it can facilitate the constraint of decision-making power and form a complete chain of supervision in order to squeeze as much institutionalized space of self-service as possible. What is more important is to open up institutionalized channels for the public interest to merge into the decision-making system so as to maximize the public interest and to realize the clean and efficient governance of the decision-making process. To be more specific, at the input end, the expression mechanism of public interest should be improved to curb the interest groups’ control of the public policy agenda; within the decision-making system, a sound decision-making mechanism should be designed to integrate public interests and to prevent unauthorized access to private interests; and at the output end, especially in the choice of decisions, a democratic resolution mechanism should exert its full impact. This corruption governance, which is based on the control of the decision-making process, is an effective way to supervise the “leaders” in our current system. The position of the “leaders” determines the difficulty of monitoring them. Controlling the decision-making process will transform the supervision of leaders (people) into the supervision of decision-making (things), thus transforming the focus on “things” to that on “people”. This is undoubtedly of great significance to the avoidance of the negative impact of supervision caused by authority.Any political or administrative activity can be separated into decision-making, execution and supervision, and correspondingly, power can be divided into the power of decision-making, the power of execution and the power of supervision. According to this classic framework of trisection, corruption falls into the corruption in decision-making, the corruption in execution and the corruption in supervision. Among them, the corruption in decision-making refers to the deviation of the exercise of public power from public interest in decision-making. Specifically, in the process of decision-making in law and/or policy, development planning, the selection and appointment of officials, public investment, and so on, the decision maker disobeys public interest or gains an unfair advantage for its own interest or for the stakeholders. It is not only distinguished from decision errors by its subjective factor, but also different in their objective performance from corruption in execution and supervision, such as authority and effectiveness. The current tough corruption issue faced by our party and government has much to do with those "leaders" who are mainly responsible for decision-making, indicating the lack of corruption control in China’s current decision-making system. Therefore, the effective control of corruption in decision-making is of great significance to solve the problem of party and government leaders’ corruption. Under the framework of In-Out system analysis, the absence of restriction and supervision mechanism at the input side, within-system and output side of the present decision-making system has left institutionalized space for the realization of improper self-interest and led to the corruption in decision. For this reason, the public-interest-oriented mechanism for power restriction and supervision should be established and strengthened because it can facilitate the constraint of decision-making power and form a complete chain of supervision in order to squeeze as much institutionalized space of self-service as possible. What is more important is to open up institutionalized channels for the public interest to merge into the decision-making system so as to maximize the public interest and to realize the clean and efficient governance of the decision-making process. To be more specific, at the input end, the expression mechanism of public interest should be improved to curb the interest groups’ control of the public policy agenda; within the decision-making system, a sound decision-making mechanism should be designed to integrate public interests and to prevent unauthorized access to private interests; and at the output end, especially in the choice of decisions, a democratic resolution mechanism should exert its full impact. This corruption governance, which is based on the control of the decision-making process, is an effective way to supervise the “leaders” in our current system. The position of the “leaders” determines the difficulty of monitoring them. Controlling the decision-making process will transform the supervision of leaders (people) into the supervision of decision-making (things), thus transforming the focus on “things” to that on “people”. This is undoubtedly of great significance to the avoidance of the negative impact of supervision caused by authority.