The average shareholding proportion of the largest shareholders in Chinese listed companies exceeds 30%， and majority shareholders can make decisions directly based on superiority of control rights， while rights of minority shareholders are often ignored. To protect minority shareholders’ rights， China Securities Regulatory Commission （CSRC） has guided the listed companies to implement internet voting system for shareholders’ meeting， and encouraged minority shareholders to participate in corporate governance through attending shareholders’ meeting. Up to now， the network voting practice has been carried out for nearly 10 years and the voting mechanism has been improved greatly. However， voting rates of shareholders’ meetings are not high， and a large number of minority shareholders abstain from voting. Why have voting participation rates not increased while internet voting system for shareholders’ meeting has improved？ Which factors affect the voting behavior of the minority shareholders？ There are few literatures focusing on minority shareholders participating in corporate governance， and researches on abstention behavior of minority shareholders have not been fully developed yet． Using the shareholders’ meeting voting data of the companies listed on Shenzhen Securities Exchange from 2007-2012， this paper analyzes the factors affecting abstention rates of shareholders’ meeting and reveals the internal mechanism of the shareholders’ abstaining from voting. The empirical results show as follows: （1） reflecting the degree of information asymmetry index of voting resolutions ″market attention″ and benefit dependency index are two important factors for investors’ participating in the vote. That resolution information of shareholders’ meetings is open to the public can help reduce abstention rates， and investors can be driven by their benefit to participate in the vote.（2）Investors’ participation in the vote is based on resolutions being concerned by the market. Abstention rates are high，even if resolutions relates to the rights of investors， unless the voting information is observed by investors. That is to say， benefit dependency can only influence voting rates of resolutions that draw high market attention. （3） According to the cumulative abnormal returns before the vote， resolutions are divided into two types， ″good resolution″ and ″bad resolution.″ The factors influencing abstention rates of these two types differ greatly. The benefit dependency has significantly negative impact on abstention rate of ″good resolution，″ but the impact of market attention on abstention rates is not significant. While market attention has significantly negative impact on abstention rates of ″bad resolution，″ and benefit dependency has no significant influence on abstention rates. （4）Accordingly， based on analysis and conclusion， this paper provides policy suggestions about minority shareholders participating in shareholders’ meeting． The innovative points of this paper are as follows: from the perspective of information asymmetry and benefit dependency of resolutions， this paper analyzes voting behavior of minority shareholders and their motivations. In order to explore the abstention behavior of minority shareholders properly， this paper uses the abstention rates data. Resolutions are divided ″good resolution″ and ″bad resolution，″ and different influences on these two types between information asymmetry and benefit dependency are compared. Quantile regression （QR） method is used to get reasonable conclusions. Since the conclusions of this paper focus on minority shareholders’ participation in corporate governance， it deepens the theoretical research on the protection of minority shareholders’ rights． Using the shareholders meeting voting data of the companies listed on Shenzhen Securities Exchange from 2007-2012， this paper analyzes the factors affecting abstention rates of shareholders meeting and reveals the internal mechanism of the shareholders abstaining from voting. The empirical results show as follows: （1） reflecting the degree of information asymmetry index of voting resolutions ″market attention″ and benefit dependency index are two important factors for investors participating in the vote. That resolution information of shareholders meetings is open to the public can help reduce abstention rates， and investors can be driven by their benefit to participate in the vote.（2）Investors participation in the vote is based on resolutions being concerned by the market. Abstention rates are high，even if resolutions relates to the rights of investors， unless the voting information is observed by investors. That is to say， benefit dependency can only influence voting rates of resolutions that draw high market attention. （3） According to the cumulative abnormal returns before the vote， resolutions are divided into two types， ″good resolution″ and ″bad resolution.″ The factors influencing abstention rates of these two types differ greatly. The benefit dependency has significantly negative impact on abstention rate of ″good resolution，″ but the impact of market attention on abstention rates is not significant. While market attention has significantly negative impact on abstention rates of ″bad resolution，″ and benefit dependency has no significant influence on abstention rates. （4）Accordingly， based on analysis and conclusion， this paper provides policy suggestions about minority shareholders participating in shareholders meeting． The innovative points of this paper are as follows: from the perspective of information asymmetry and benefit dependency of resolutions， this paper analyzes voting behavior of minority shareholders and their motivations. In order to explore the abstention behavior of minority shareholders properly， this paper uses the abstention rates data. Resolutions are divided ″good resolution″ and ″bad resolution，″ and different influences on these two types between information asymmetry and benefit dependency are compared. Quantile regression （QR） method is used to get reasonable conclusions. Since the conclusions of this paper focus on minority shareholders participation in corporate governance， it deepens the theoretical research on the protection of minority shareholders rights．