Abstract：The trust in Internet economy is directly related to the credit of network service providers. Credit rating has become one of the information factors in the allocation of market resources. In order to compete for market share, many network service providers conduct false transactions, aiming to increase their credit rating. False transaction disrupts the trust-generating mechanism in the Internet economy, and therefore necessitates effective regulatory instrument to curb it. However, from a preventive perspective, the current regulation on false transaction reveals a number of problems. According to the logic of prevention theory, the deterrence of legal structure depends on the probability of punishment for illegal conducts and the severity of punishment. Under this theory, there is a reverse-causality relationship between these two indicators. When a certain deterrent force needs to be maintained, if the probability of investigation and punishment is not high, severe punishment must be matched with the corresponding low probability; otherwise, when the probability of investigation and punishment is significantly increased, it is possible to match the corresponding lower disciplinary tools. In the current regulatory system, the punishment for false transaction is too light and the probabilities of investigation and punishment are low, which make the deterrent force largely inadequate. Because of these problems, the wrongdoings about false transaction continue to increase. The basic reason for the ineffective regulation is that the current regulatory instruments do not keep in pace with the system of Internet economy. The core of the Internet is information economy. The marginal cost of the operation of the Internet is very low. The costly traditional regulatory instruments are unable to regulate the Internet market, which is unprecedented in scale. The Internet market necessitates new regulatory instrument with low marginal cost so that the latter can effectively achieve the regulatory objectives. Facing the rampancy of false transaction enforcement, the Chinese government needs to upgrade the regulatory instruments. A feasible approach to upgrading the existing regulations is to reconcile the system of Internet economy with effective regulatory instruments. More specifically, this article will use prevention theory as the analysis framework by applying its two indicators. According to prevention theory, in the Internet economy, the limitation in enforcement resources and technology hinder the increase of probability of investigation and punishment, but the increase of punishment severity can focus on the multi-stage illegal costs of wrongdoings. Therefore, a comprehensive regulatory instrument that penetrates into different stages of punishment is helpful to improving the deterrent force under the real dilemma of low detection rate. In this sense, coordinated application of credit instruments could generate adequate deterrence that prevents the potential wrongdoing of false transaction. It is a low-cost regulatory approach with long-term and stable effects. The key of credit instrument is to effectively disclose negative credit information and to set up a joint-disciplinary system aiming to punish breach of trust. However, none of the current instruments is able to achieve this goal. Under the background of establishing the Chinese credit investigation system, this article proposes to establish a coordinated legal system covering collection, rating, disclosure and applying the information of false transaction. More specifically, the concrete requirements for creating such framework are comprehensive and effective information collection, unified credit rating system, effective flow of negative information, and lawful and effective use of negative credit information. This system aims to facilitate the flow of information regarding the subject's false transaction. By reputational punishment and joint-disciplinary system, a rational deterrent force can be generated.
陈兆誉. 互联网经济中炒信行为的规制路径[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2018, 4(6): 203-.
Chen Zhaoyu. The Regulatory Approach to Proventing False Transaction in Internet Economy. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2018, 4(6): 203-.
