Integration of land is usually involved in the process of industrialization, urbanization and urban renewal by integrating the dispersed property right for development. Through combing the connotation, mechanism and solution of the holdout problems in the United States, it is found that land integration in the US mainly relies on the market mechanism and the holdout problems occur mainly in market transactions which is an important reason causing inefficient land use, such as American urban sprawl, central city decline and real estate value loss. In order to solve the holdout problem in the process of land integration, overcoming the threat of dispersed land ownership to land integration, American society has carried out fruitful exploration and practice of classification, that is: Private projects being handed over to the market with introduction of″secretagent mechanism″ and introducing expropriation power to public project. In addition to these two practices, the United States has also explored breaking the holdout problem through private ownership structure innovation, governance innovation, public-private cooperation and collective collaboration. Based on the experience of private rights innovation and governance innovation, Michael Heller further proposed the LAD program. In contrast, the integration of land in China mainly depends on the expropriation power of government and the holdout problems also occur mainly in the process of expropriation and administration-led transformation of the old city. The function expansion of expropriation power and the obscure nature of expropriation power result in the frequent holdout problems in China. The way out for holdout problems in China lies in the ease of expropriation power and achieving a clear nature state of it. That is: on the one hand, land attainment and integration for public interest belong to expropriation power, strengthening public power nature of it, restoring the true nature and forming the due respect from the whole society for the right to levy, thus to completely clear up the holdout behaviors; on the other hand, business land acquisition and integration belong to the market by strengthening the use of market mechanism in land development and integration. But as Americas experience shows, when narrowing the scope of land expropriation, and allowing business land being transacted directly in the market, and introducing the market mechanisms to promote urban renewal, the encounter of market oriented land integration with stubborn resistance will also be inevitably. At this time, the land integration mechanism and holdout problems both in China and the US will have a similar logic. Therefore, the experience and lessons of the United States with regard to solve holdout problems of householders is highlighted later on.
靳相木 陈 箫. 美国土地整合中的钉子户问题及其启示[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2017, 3(3): 183-.
Jin Xiangmu Chen Xiao. The Holdout Problem in the Process of Land Assembly in America and Its Implications. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2017, 3(3): 183-.