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| The U.S. Sanctions Against China: Evolutionary Trends, International Law Analysis, and China’s Response |
| Huo Zhengxin, Yan Yuhong |
| School of International Law, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing 100088, China |
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Abstract The Trump Administration, followed by the Biden Administration, viewed China as the main strategic competitor of the United States. Since then, the justifications, methods and frequency of U.S. sanctions against China have changed significantly. A study on the evolutionary trends of U.S. sanctions against China by reviewing the legality of those sanctions from the perspective of international law is of great importance in that it is imperative for China to predict the precise directions and critical areas of U.S. sanctions in the future, so that the foreign-related legal fights can be managed more effectively to respond to external risks and challenges and improve the counter-foreign sanctions law of China in domestic and foreign-related affairs.This article, which is based on both theoretical and practical analysis by employing quantitative and qualitative method, reviews the legislation and measures of the U.S. sanctions against China since the 1990s. It follows that, as the gap in the comprehensive national power between the two countries has been narrowed, the China-US cooperation on economic and trade matters has undergone foundational changes, and the focus of the U.S. national security strategy has been shifted to containing China. Consequently, the justifications, targets and methods of its sanctions against China have changed dramatically. The sporadic and accidental sanctions have been replaced by targeted, accurate and regular sanctions; and new types of sanctions such as “human rights sanctions”, “technological decoupling” and “rule decoupling” have been more frequently employed. It can be predicted that the U.S. sanctions against China will focus on high-tech and new industries and on some other critical areas.Since China and the United States are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the two countries shall carry out their sanctions or countersanctions within the framework of the WTO Agreements. This article finds that, the U.S. fails to meet the conditions for invoking the WTO national security exception to justify its “technological decoupling” sanctions against China, nor does it fulfil the conditions for precluding the wrongfulness of these sanctions in accordance with customary international law, in particular, the rules on countermeasures under the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Moreover, regardless of whether the “rule decoupling” sanctions are covered by the WTO Agreements, China is entitled to the settlement of dispute at the WTO as long as these sanctions nullify or impair China’s legitimate expectations of the benefits based on the “special and differential treatment” clauses under the Agreements.This article provides suggestions for China to respond to the U.S. sanctions with good reason, with advantage and with restraint both at domestic and international levels. Given that the Biden Administration is taking efforts to strengthen its relations with its alliances and taking advantage of international organizations to compete against China, it is argued that China should attach more importance to the important international organization mechanisms like WTO and the United Nations to create more opportunities for negotiations and cooperations with other countries so as to counter against U.S. sanctions. Moreover, China should continue to fill its countersanctions toolbox within the framework of international law, and to improve the procedural requirements for countersanctions.
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Received: 24 October 2023
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2024, Vol. 54 
