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| A Study on the Systematic Optimization of Village-level Power Supervision Mechanism: Based on the Research Path of Theoretical Basis, Policy Basis and Practical Analysis |
| Wang Jiegui |
| Department of Public Affairs, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou 310018, China |
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Abstract The systematic dilemma of village-level power supervision mechanism leads to the lack of effectiveness of village-level power supervision, and the existing studies of village-level power supervision mechanism have limitations such as unclear definition of core concepts, unclear theoretical basis, insufficient policy basis and lack of systematic practical analysis. Given the systematic dilemma and theoretical research limitations of the village-level power supervision mechanism, it is of theoretical and practical significance to follow the research path of concept definition， theoretical basis， policy basis， system dilemma， systematic optimization path and explore the systematic optimization path of the village-level power supervision mechanism. Theoretically, it can break through the limitations of the research of the village-level power supervision mechanism, and in practice, it can provide the theoretical basis, policy basis and optimization path for the improvement of the village-level power supervision mechanism.Village-level power is the decisive force in the administrative domain of the village for democratic elections, democratic consultations, democratic decision-making, democratic management and democratic supervisions. The village-level power supervision mechanism is an organic system to realize the effective operations of village-level power supervision, including the three core elements of village-level power supervision relationship, mechanism operation mode and the supporting institutions of mechanism operation.The practice of the power supervision theory in the primary level of rural areas can promote the theoretical innovations of the village-level power supervision mechanism. Marxist power supervision theory can promote the innovations of the village-level power supervision theory. Democratic supervision theory can promote the innovation of village-level democratic supervision theory. Social power theory can promote the innovation of village-level multi-subject power supervision theory. The theory of institutional change can promote the theoretical innovation of village-level power supervision mechanism optimization.For more than 20 years, the village-level power supervision policy of China’s “No. 1 Central Document” has evolved along the path of standardizing supervision behavior, innovating supervision institution arrangements, innovating supervision mechanism and improving the efficiency of supervision mechanism. The construction of village-level power supervision mechanism is the inevitable result of village-level power supervision policy evolution and policy practice; the village-level power supervision mechanism has gone through three stages—village-level democratic supervision mechanism, village affairs’ supervision mechanism and the diversification of village-level power supervision mechanism; the optimization of village-level power supervision mechanism can promote the improvement in supervision efficiency. Village-level power supervision policy provides a policy basis for the systematic optimization of village-level power supervision mechanism.The village-level power supervision mechanism has systematic difficulties. First, there are insufficient stability, complexity and imbalance. Second, the operation mode of village-level power supervision mechanism has four problems: weak power supervision mode, inefficient legal supervision mode, weak moral supervision mode and poor right supervision mode. Third, the village-level power supervision mechanism operation supporting institution is not sound.The systematic optimization path of the village-level power supervision mechanism is as follows: first, clarify the subject and object of the village-level power supervision, clarify the relationship of the village-level power supervision, and enhance the autonomy and independence of the supervision power; second, the village-level power supervision mechanism should promote the optimization of the power supervision mode, legal supervision mode, moral supervision mode and right supervision mode； third, the key to improving the supporting system of the village-level power supervision mechanism is to realize the effective supply, efficient operation and efficiency improvement of the institutions.
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Received: 22 December 2023
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2024, Vol. 54 
