论多边主义的秩序功能及其法治构成

doi:10.3785/j.issn.1008-942X.CN33-6000/C.2022.01.098

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Abstract Multilateralism is widely upheld as the basic paradigm for building orders in the contemporary international society. It is theoretically opposed to conservative notions like nationalism, unilateralism, etc. that advocate particularism and power politics. At present, the multilateral international system is witnessing a discourse competition between openness and monopoly as well as inclusiveness and exclusion. Discharging the true connotation of multilateralism and promoting the evolution of international orders are issues of this millennium faced by all members of the international community and even all mankind. In reality, the institutional realization and effective operation of order-oriented functionality of multilateralism lay the political foundation and legal basis for the international community to tackle global risks and the common challenges of the humanity through collective actions.Multilateralism in the new era is intended to provide the elementary means to restrain unilateral propensity. Its order-oriented functionality originates from the legitimacy-shaping power it contains. The pluralistic characteristic of the world prompts the social construction of national identities and interests, and under such a circumstance, multilateralism supplies the potential paths and policy tools for dealing with externalities and achieving balance among multiple values and objectives. International law plays the normative roles in curbing hegemony, restricting arbitrary power and facilitating international cooperation. Multilateralism possesses both negative and positive functional dimensions in building international orders, with the former serving to reduce the level of anarchic condition of the international community through general rules of conduct, while the latter offering institutions or arrangements with purposes of attaining common objectives and improving the concordance between national interest and that of international community as a whole. The order-oriented functions of a multilateral international system include confirming equal identities, consolidating agreed rules, prioritizing legal governance, and ensuring order stability, all of which aim at developing an international order carrying out fundamental principles such as egalitarian governance, international democracy, and rule of international law.It is the substance of multilateralism that countries universally accept the normative constraints of international law, which are basically embodied in four legal principles enunciated as follows. Firstly, the states participate in the construction of the legitimacy of international order as an equal trustee of the humanity, establish the community identity expectation, and generate international public goods by adopting collective approaches. Secondly, the states comply with the systemic principles of openness and non-discrimination, put forward a pattern of orders that is inclusive rather than exclusive of pluralistic reality, and ensure that all members share the governance benefits fairly. Thirdly, the states jointly safeguard the stability and predictability of the international system and advance the general expectations and interests of the international community. Finally, the states implement international law by resorting to common will, strengthen institutional effectiveness through coordinated efforts, and limit the negative consequences of arbitrary reciprocity.Along with multilateralism, unilateralism constitutes an essential part of the normativity of international relations, which in essence reflects the attempts to influence international legitimacy in an individual form. For acts that pursue national policies or values through unilateral measures instead of international cooperation, multilateralism tends to impose stricter primary and secondary legal controls. The primary control determines the unilateral interests or values that may be accommodated in the multilateral international system, and the secondary one demonstrates the existence of a genuine, necessary and reasonable link between unilateral measures and the accommodated interests or protected values. The multilateral legal control exerting on unilateral measures usually includes three phases concerning good faith obligation, substantive standards and procedural conditions respectively.In the context of global governance, the international balance of power has been undergoing huge changes, and the global needs for equal, fair and effective governance in various areas become more urgent, which makes the multilateral international system face stronger impetus for reconstructing legitimacy and enhancing institutional build-up. China advocates the practice of true multilateralism, which would, through gaining active and constructive global momentum, give full play to the functionality of multilateralism in equal participation, effective operation and fair enjoyment in the new international order.

Key words： multilateralism unilateralism international law international order order-building functionality rule of law

Received: 09 January 2022

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Li Jiang. On the Order-oriented Functionality of Multilateralism and Its Legal Constitutive Elements[J]. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2022, 52(11): 26-39.

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https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/EN/10.3785/j.issn.1008-942X.CN33-6000/C.2022.01.098 OR https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/EN/Y2022/V52/I11/26

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