With the distinction between freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-domination, I identify three kinds of freedom, the first psychological or mental, the second ethical or moral, and the third political or social. It is important to distinguish these different ideals of freedom, not just for reasons of clarity, but also for reasons of policy. Just as the robot fits this minimal specification for being an agent, so will most animals, in particular human animals like you and me. We may be rather more versatile in the purposes we pursue, and better equipped in the sources of evidence that shape our representations, but still it remains true that we resemble the robot in normally pursuing those purposes according to those representations. But we human beings differ in one striking respect from the robot, and perhaps from all other animals. We often deliberate in the course of forming our representations and our purposes; we are not confined, like the robot, to responding more or less autonomically to the changes it registers in its environment. Our deliberative capacity is important because, as I shall argue, it is what makes room for the idea of the free will. Deliberation is an activity, sometimes described as reasoning, in which we intentionally think about the things we register in some representations with a view to letting them determine other representations we form, or purposes we endorse, or actions we pursue. Our interest here is in the practical deliberation that helps to shape action. In this deliberative process it is essential that you take each of the options under consideration to represent a live possibility: to be something you might choose. You conduct yourself according to more or less well-understood rules of evidence and argument, validated in exchange with others; these determine what sorts of considerations count in favor of what options, for example, and what weights they have in relation to other considerations. When you think that whether you take one or another option in a choice is up to how your deliberation goes, what you register is that whether you take it is up to you: that is, up to how you conduct yourself in deliberation. But you have to think that you have free will in making the choice. For to think that you have free will is just to think that what you choose is up to you; it is something of which you are in control. On this account, freedom in the will consists in the ability to make deliberatively conducted choices, in particular deliberatively well-conducted choices, you have that ability with respect to a future choice, and you think correctly that you can do this or do that. The difference between freedom in the will and freedom of the will is nicely caught in an analogy with playing the piano. Think of the old joke: ″Can you play the piano?″ ″I dont know, Ive never tried.″ This forces us to distinguish between the ability to play the piano that any normally equipped child or adult possesses and the skill of playing the piano that only comes with practice. Freedom in the will is an ability akin to the piano-playing ability of the normal child or adult. Freedom of the will is a skill akin to that which only the trained pianist achieves. And it is similar to a distinction that Henry Sidgwick took Kant to have overlooked. This is the distinction between autonomy in the sense of an ability and autonomy in the sense of an achievement. According to Sidgwick, Kant sometimes casts autonomy as the ability to reason that marks off human beings from other animals and sometimes as a skill or achievement that only some people exhibit: that of exercising their autonomy properly, resisting the impulses and temptations that would alienate them from themselves. To have freedom in the will is just to be able to exercise deliberative control in whatever choices are available, over whatever options are on offer. But of course you could have such freedom and yet be subject to my will in the matter of which choices are available, which options are on offer and whether you should continue to enjoy such a range of choice. Similarly, to have freedom of the will is to possess the skill of exercising deliberative control over whatever choices are available. But of course you could have such freedom, once again, and yet be subject to me in the same way. The lesson is that we must recognize a third kind of freedom: that which consists in not being subject to anyone else’s will in the exercise of deliberation and choice. This is what I describe as freedom for the will. What does it mean for you to be subject to my will in a given choice? Let the choice be defined by the range of options at your disposal: say doing X, Y or Z. And let it be granted that absent subjection to the will of others, you have all the personal, natural and social resources required for being able to do X or do Y or do Z. The question then is what might make it the case that you are subject to my will — or by extension, the will of any other — in the exercise of that choice. I will certainly subject you to my will if I remove any option in that choice, whether overtly or covertly, preventing you from making it, perhaps by resorting to sheer force or subtle agenda-fixing. Some contemporary thinkers hold that this is essentially the only way in which I can subject you to my will — or, alternatively, interfere in your choice. But their motivation is to make interference into a readily chartable, measureable evil and I think that this is insufficient to support the line they take. For it is surely clear — and is accepted on most sides — that I can also interfere in two other ways. Rather than removing one or another option, I can replace it by a penalized alternative, whether overtly or covertly: I can allow you to choose X or Y, as they are, but replace Z by Z-with-a-penalty. And whether or not I actually remove or replace an option, I can remove or replace it in your perceptions. Assuming I don’t actually remove or replace it, for example, I can misrepresent it, whether by misleading you into thinking it is unavailable or subject to a penalty or by manipulating you into thinking about it in a distorted, unappealing way. Thus there are three distinct modes of interference by means of which I can subject you to my will in a choice: I can remove an option, I can replace an option — in either case you may or may not be aware of what I do — or I can misrepresent an option. These forms of interference can vary in degree, since one or more options may be removed or replaced or misrepresented; the replacement may be more or less radical, depending on how severe the attached penalty is; and the misrepresentation may be more or less resistible, depending on the resources of deception or manipulation deployed. But still they all count as ways in which I may impose myself on you, restricting your capacity to exercise your will — to choose as you wish — among the options that define the choice. Or at least they count as ways in which I may impose myself, assuming that the imposition is not licensed or allowed by you: it is not subject to your own control and in that sense is arbitrary. Unlike the interference that his sailors practice with Ulysses when they keep him bound to the mast, this imposition is arbitrary in the sense of putting another’s will in control. Freedom in the will is presupposed by this account to both the other forms of the ideal. You cannot have freedom of the will without it, since you cannot be skilled in the exercise of an ability you do not have. And you cannot have freedom for the will without it, since you cannot be protected in the exercise of choices that it is not within your capacity to make. But you can have freedom of the will without freedom for the will. And equally you can have freedom for the will without having freedom of the will; no matter how weak-willed you are, there is room and call for enjoying protection against the domination of others. Each of those forms of freedom requires freedom in the will but neither variety requires the other. You can be ethically free and politically vulnerable or politically free and ethically lacking.