The “Spotlight” Effect of the Investor Service Center: Empirical Evidence from Corporate Tax Avoidance Perspective
Han Hongling1, Chen Shuaidi1, Liu Qiang2, Wang Xinyue2
1.School of Management, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China 2.School of Economics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China 3.Institute for Fiscal;Big-Data & Policy of Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China
Abstract:Safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium investors is fundamental for ensuring the orderly operation of the capital market. However, small and medium investors have long been in a disadvantageous position of limited information, without laws and regulations to protect them, highlighting the need for further protection mechanisms. The China Securities Small and Medium Investor Service Center (CSSMISC), as a regulatory minority shareholder, plays a crucial role in the protection of small and medium investors, due to its dual identities as a market entity and a regulatory institution with auxiliary function. Its ability of shareholding, exercising the right and speaking represents an important innovation in the mechanism of protecting small and medium investors. This study focuses on the A-share companies in China from 2016 to 2019, and investigates the extent and pathways of CSSMISC to influences corporate tax avoidance. The empirical findings demonstrate that the exercise of rights of CSSMISC can effectively reduce the tax avoidance of the enterprises. Mechanism tests reveal that the right exercise of CSSMISC attracts the attention of the media, investors, and regulatory authorities to the target company, creating a “spotlight” effect, that inhibits aggressive tax avoidance practices. Furthermore, the study finds that online exercise of right of CSSMISC can generate a stronger “spotlight” effect compared to the on-site exercise, thus playing a significant role in reducing corporate tax avoidance. In areas of lower degree of tax digitalization, with lower tax collection and management intensity, CSSMISC has a greater impact on reducing tax avoidance behaviors after exercising its rights. Similarly, in companies with lower institutional shareholding ratios, higher management remuneration and greater financing constraints, the right exercise of CSSMISC has a more pronounced effect on corporate tax avoidance. These findings indicate that the “spotlight” effect generated by the right exercise of CSSMISC enhances corporate transparency, improves the internal and external governance environment of companies, and compensates for the deficiencies in corporate governance supervision.Compared with existing researches, this paper presents several innovative contributions. Firstly, it explores the economic consequences of the exercise of rights by CSSMISC, starting from the perspective of corporate tax avoidance. This approach furthers the study on the relation among the protection of small and medium investors, CSSMISC and enterprise tax avoidance. The study finds a novel perspective: the “spotlight” effect, investigating the impact of the exercise of rights of CSSMISC on media, supervision, and small and medium-sized investors. By enhancing the logical chain connecting the exercise of rights by CSSMISC to corporate tax avoidance, the paper offers a new insight and evidence regarding the ability of CSSMISC to mitigate enterprise tax avoidance. The study takes a comprehensive approach by examining the heterogeneous performance of CSSMISC’s exercise of rights from multiple perspectives, including the right exercise mode of CSSMISC, the intensity of corporate tax collection and management, the level of digitalization in tax collection and management, the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, the salary of senior executives, and the level of financing constraints. By analyzing the asymmetric performance of the economic consequences resulting from the exercise of right by CSSMISC, the study provides valuable insights. Overall, this paper demonstrates that CSSMISC can effectively protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors by generating heightened attention from the media, investors, and regulators through the amplified “spotlight” effect, resulting from the holding of a minority share. The findings also contribute to the understanding and enrichment of the economic consequences of minority shareholders’ involvement in corporate governance. The study provides a theoretical foundation for improving and optimizing specific measures related to the exercise of rights by CSSMISC. Additionally, it bolsters an example for the implementation of innovative supervision methods by CSSMISC, and provides policy support for the development of corporate tax governance.
韩洪灵, 陈帅弟, 刘强, 汪昕玥. 投服中心行权的“聚光灯”效应研究[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2023, 53(11): 40-61.
Han Hongling, Chen Shuaidi, Liu Qiang, Wang Xinyue. The “Spotlight” Effect of the Investor Service Center: Empirical Evidence from Corporate Tax Avoidance Perspective. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2023, 53(11): 40-61.
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