Abstract:The Chinese character “我(Wo)”, which means I or me, exists in both ancient and modern Chinese. However, the ambiguity use of “Wo” is misleading. In my opinion, I comprises three components which are called “little I”, “great I” and “self I” (ego), respectively. However, in ancient Chinese philosophy, the “self I” was missing, which means that the I encompasses two denotations, i.e. “little I” and “great I”. the concept of “little I” refers to the natural and physical being which is the agent of some behaviors driven by survival instinct. The “little I” which acts according to its natural inclination requires being obligated and normalized. Hence, traditional Confucianism claims that people may be reformed by achieving the selfless and desireless I, being detached to the natural surviving and presenting universal “great I”. By being selfless, people achieve “Axiom of Mastery”, called “Ren” or “All in One” in ancient China. In this scenario “great I” represents the unity with the universal justice. From the thinking of human survival, “great I” refers to all human beings holding natural desires. As all human beings, we are not a plural in statistics but a collection or a genus, in which the objective basis for the genus is the human nature of the genus. The presentation of the common nature or the transcendent principle changes the identity of human beings, which means that the natural “little I” is transformed into the universal “great I”, and as a result, natural being turns out to be moral being. The formation of this new identity arises from the ontological definition of the ontology of being, by means of reflection, by reflecting on one’s own belonging (such as human nature), making oneself a member of the group to which one belongs. The reflection of belonging is generated from the self-motivated “self I”, which is the acceptance of the universal entity from the autonomous “self I”. Generally speaking, it contains the common “pure I”, being open and variable. The determinate “pure I” always identifies itself in a specific action. The core of the “pure I” is autonomy which generates motivation from the thinking of the self. The entity driven by autonomy is exactly the “self I” with independence and freedom, being capable to be dominant and speak out. The survival of human being is a mutual-induction act based on the independent and free reflection of the “self I”. On the one hand, the “self I” dominates the reflection, internalizing the external common characteristics to internal identical awareness, forming the “great I”. The “great I” is the human realization of ubiquitous and common transcendence of self-existence. On the other hand, from a practical point of view, the “great I” is expressed as the chase after general principles. However, the chase after general principles requires the presence of the “self I” as only “self I” can observe and realize general principles. In this process the reciprocal induction is generated between the “self I” driven by the transcendental autonomy and transcendental entity while the “little I”, “great I” and “self I” form a unity, generating an act which has both individual freedom and social norms and order. Traditional Confucianism regards “I” as “little I” and “great I”, lacking the thinking of the “self I” which raises to the interruption during the transformation from idea to specific norm. As a result, traditional Confucianism believes in regulating people with general norms using the power of authority, placing people in the position of a gear in a machine.
沈顺福. 论“我”的三个向度[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2022, 52(12): 115-125.
Shen Shunfu. On the Three Dimensions of I/Me. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2022, 52(12): 115-125.
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