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作为义务的实质来源: 规范支配论之确立与展开
苏彩霞 肖晶
The Substantial Origin of the Obligation of Action: The Establishment and Development of Normative Dominance Theory
Su Caixia Xiao Jing

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摘要 

规范支配论以法益对支配者行为的依赖为现实基础,以社会对支配者行为的期待为规范基础,主张当存在现实的支配或者规范拟制的支配时,均可以认定存在作为义务的实质基础。规范支配论之支配囊括了支配意思、现实支配行为、支配可能性等多个层次,是一个集主观与客观、现实与可能于一身的复杂概念。更重要的是,支配概念甚至能够超越其作为行为人本身特性的地位,进入社会功能与社会评价领域,成为作为义务面向现实社会生活进行实质化运动的桥梁。支配的判断标准包括支配的可能性、相当性与优越性三要素。规范支配论作为作为义务的实质来源,除具有合理限定作为义务的范围、利于建立合理的违法性程度衡量标准、利于保证刑法独立的优越性等优点外,还具有宽泛的理论解释力,值得提倡与贯彻。

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苏彩霞 肖晶
Abstract

Normative dominance theory, taking reliance of legal benefits on dominators' behaviors as a realistic basis, and expectation for dominators' behaviors from society as a normative basis, advocates that the existence of realistic dominance or normative fictional dominance can both be identified as the presence of substantive basis of duties. The above mentioned ″reliance of legal benefits on dominators' behaviors″ refers to preservation of legal benefits which depends on dominators to direct the cause and effect flow towards orientation of avoiding damages. This reliance is reality-oriented, which is the realistic basis of dominance. The above mentioned ″expectation for dominators' behaviors from society″means that the society has expectation for the rational behaviors adopted by dominators who take the dominant position in cause and effect flow of legal benefits damages to preserve legal benefits. This expectation constitutes the normative reason of the society to expect dominators to adopt legal benefits preservation actions. The definition of dominance in normative dominance theory includes multiple layers, that is, the idea of dominance, realistic dominance behaviors and dominance possibilities, etc. It is a complex concept that gathers the subjectivity and objectivity, and reality and possibility together. More importantly, the concept of dominance can even surpass the position as an intrinsic identification of the doer and enter into the field of social function and social evaluation, which becomes the bridge to conduct substantive behaviors facing realistic social activities as duties. Including the value judgment, this normative dominance cannot be solely decided from the level of facts. The judgment standards of dominance include three elements: the possibility, equipollence, and superiority of dominance. The possibility of dominance refers to the possibility of the doer to prevent harmful consequences from happening. The equipollence of dominance means that dominance must conform to the empirical law of mass social life. According to the mass social life experience, accidental dominance or fictional dominance which does not meet the empirical law should be excluded from the scope of duties. The superiority of dominance requires that the obligor shall have certain superiority in the dominance possibility of legal benefits cause and effect flow compared with the mass, while exclusive dominance of the doer in cause and effect flow is not necessarily required. As the substantial origin of legal duties, normative dominance theory reasonably defines the scope of legal duties, benefits the establishment of reasonable measuring criteria of illegality degree, and has the advantage in helping to ensure the independence of penal law etc. Meanwhile, it also has broad theoretical explanatory power, so the normative dominance theory is worth advocating and implementing.

    
引用本文:   
苏彩霞 肖晶. 作为义务的实质来源: 规范支配论之确立与展开[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2015, 1(4): 94-108. Su Caixia Xiao Jing. The Substantial Origin of the Obligation of Action: The Establishment and Development of Normative Dominance Theory. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2015, 1(4): 94-108.
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https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/CN/     或     https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/CN/Y2015/V1/I4/94
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