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技术溢出、节能减排与社会福利----基于竞争策略的煤电厂商动态博弈分析
唐兆希 肖文
Technology Spillover, Energy-saving, Emission-reducing and Social Welfare: A Multi-stage Oligopolistic Game Model on CFP with Typical Competitive Strategies
Tang Zhaoxi Xiao Wen

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摘要 

煤电运营商最重要的一类生产决策,是如何将运营成本在燃料成本支出、节能创新投入和环保创新投入之间做出相对合理的配置,在达到污染排放标准的同时实现企业利润最大化。基于寡头垄断市场结构的煤电厂商两期动态博弈,存在三类典型竞争策略下的最优创新水平和最优产量水平的市场均衡。均衡创新水平和均衡产量均随着节能环保创新比例的增大而增大,而节能创新技术溢出对均衡产量有正向影响,对均衡创新水平的影响随着市场结构的不同而变化。基于三类不同社会福利函数设定的福利经济学分析,如果考虑环保创新及其技术溢出效应,则更深程度和更广范围的各类电力市场竞争能带来更大的社会福利。

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唐兆希 肖文
关键词 技术溢出节能减排福利分析动态博弈煤电厂商竞争策略创新均衡产量均衡    
Abstract

China has become the country with the largest total energy consumption nowadays,and is also one of the largest county of coal reserves, coal-fired power generation capacity and electricity production in the world. Chinese regional electric power market structure, which seems to be oligopolistic competitive one, shows an important characteristic in the process of the market-oriented reform of Chinese electric power system. For thermal power firms such as coal-fired plants(CFP), one of the most important production decisions to make is how to allocate the operating costs among fuel costs, innovation expenditures for energy saving and those for environmental protection in order to achieve firms’ maximum profits and reduce pollutant emissions as well. The purpose of this paper is to study the market equilibrium, its influence factors and welfare implications of those decisions, and to show the policy implications which may throw light on the market-oriented reform of Chinese electric power system at present.  Based on D’Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988) classic model, we build a two-stage dynamic game model to examine CFP’s decisions in an oligopolistic market structure. On one hand, our paper both considers the firms’ innovation cost and technology spillover in the basic model. On the other hand, different from previous studies, we distinguish the heterogeneous innovations, according to the different innovation mechanism between energy-saving innovation andemission-reducing innovation in every CFP. This paper assumes that energy-saving innovation which reduces the marginal production cost and increase the firm profit would directly affect the CFP’s decisions, and this kind of innovation would also lower the resource consumption and be beneficial to the sustainable development of the economy. But for emission-reducing innovation, the environmental protection measure applied by the CFP necessary to the whole social welfare would reduce the short-run profit of the firm. Based on these two kinds of innovations above we construct the cost function of the firm in our dynamic game model. We solve and discuss CFP’s optimal innovation investment and optimal output of the dynamic equilibrium under three different typical competitive strategies respectively, examine the effects with respect to the ratio of innovation investments for energy-saving and for emission-reducing and the degree of technology spillovers. The main finding of comparative analyses is: (1) the optimal innovation investment and optimal output of the dynamic equilibrium both increase while the ratio of innovation investments for energy-saving and for emission-reducing grows. (2) the optimal innovation and optimal output of the dynamic equilibrium may both be impacted by the degree of technology spillovers but in different directions. We analyze the social welfare by comparing each equilibrium level of innovation and output under three different social welfare functions. First we define three kinds of social welfare functions respectively, (1) considering only the consumer surplus and the producer surplus, (2) consideringthe consumer surplus, the producer surplus, and the level of emission-reducing innovation, and (3) considering the consumer surplus, the producer surplus, the level of emission-reducing innovation and its spillover. The social welfare criterion we set is the distance from the social optimum level of innovation and output corresponding to the relevant social welfare function to the innovation and output of dynamic equilibrium with three different typical competitive strategies respectively. The finding of welfare analysis is that, no matter whether it is for the final product market or for the innovation one, considering innovations and their spillover channels of different kinds, more competitive market brings greater social welfare. This conclusion is not exactly the same as D’Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988) shows.

Key wordstechnology spillover    energy-saving and emission-reducing    welfare analysis    dynamic game    coal-fired plants    competitive strategy    innovation equilibrium    output equilibrium   
    
引用本文:   
唐兆希 肖文. 技术溢出、节能减排与社会福利----基于竞争策略的煤电厂商动态博弈分析[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2014, 44(5): 175-187. Tang Zhaoxi Xiao Wen. Technology Spillover, Energy-saving, Emission-reducing and Social Welfare: A Multi-stage Oligopolistic Game Model on CFP with Typical Competitive Strategies. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2014, 44(5): 175-187.
链接本文:  
https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/CN/     或     https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/CN/Y2014/V44/I5/175
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