Abstract：From the perspective of shareholder interlocked channels, this paper delves into the behavior spillover effect and influencing mechanism of violations among affiliated companies. This paper solves the endogenous problem of behavior spillover effect by controlling the proportion of the associated shareholder-interlocked companies disclosing the violations before the target listed company decides whether to engage in violations. Empirical evidence indicates that there is a significant positive behavior spillover effect among the shareholder-interlocked affiliates, i.e. the affiliates’ misconduct significantly increases the possibility of the shareholder-interlocked companies’ violations. Due to the great financing constraints, lack of cash flow and fierce market competition, non-state-owned enterprises, enterprises with low government subsidies and a higher degree of marketization in their local areas are more motivated to observe and understand the violations of shareholder-interlocked affiliates, which leads to stronger spillover effect of violations. The behavior spillover effect of illegal decisions of listed companies results from the communicating learning mechanism and the observational learning mechanism. When there are common shareholders in listed companies, there are more social network ties and social activity connections, which lays a foundation for the communicating learning and imitation among shareholder-interlocked affiliated companies. By focusing on the market reaction caused by the irregularities of shareholder-interlocked companies and the severity of punishment imposed by the regulatory agency, the listed company decides whether to carry out similar irregularities, thus developing observational learning and imitation. If regulators step up their supervision, managers of listed companies will not be able to obtain high-quality projects or make large profits through illegal means, and meanwhile the penalties for companies that break the rules will be strengthened. Therefore, the introduction of the policy to enhance the supervision of securities institutions has played a vital role in restraining the spillover effect of violations among the stockholder-interlocked affiliated companies. The restraining effect of the policy is more powerful at the beginning. However, with the loosening of the implementation and regulators, the inhibitory effect of the policy gradually declines after the implementation of the policy for a period of time. The contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, different from the existing literature on corporate rule-breaking decisions from the perspectives of financial characteristics, media, analysts and external environment, this paper discusses the factors that affect listed companies’ rule-breaking decisions from the perspective of social network connection. Secondly, from the perspective of the new interlocked channel of shareholders, this paper examines whether shareholders with the right of supervision and control will produce spillover effects of violations through the mechanism of communicating learning and observational learning. Thirdly, this paper finds that investors decide whether to imitate the behavior of other investors mainly by communicating with each other and comparing the costs and benefits of wrongdoing, which provide novel evidences for the study of capital market learning theory. Finally, the paper takes the introduction of the CPC Central Committee’s eight-point decisions as a measure of regulatory severity and examines the impact of institutional regulatory severity on the spillover effect of irregularities. This study reveals the spillover effect of rule-breaking behavior based on governance structure, and provides theoretical and empirical evidences for supporting the prevention of violations from spreading.
出版日期: 2023-02-03
引用本文:
蒋赛楠、杨柳勇、罗德明. 违规事件在股东联结关联公司间的行为溢出效应[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 0, (): 1-.
Jiang Sainan Yang Liuyong Luo Deming. Spillover Effect of Violation Events in the Behavior of Shareholders-interlocked Companies. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 0, (): 1-.
